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In the early 2000s, a highly selective university introduced a "no-loans" policy under which the loan
component of financial aid awards was replaced with grants.  We use this natural experiment to identify
the causal effect of student debt on employment outcomes.  In the standard life-cycle model, young
people make optimal educational investment decisions if they are able to finance these investments
by borrowing against future earnings; the presence of debt has only income effects on future decisions.
We find that debt causes graduates to choose substantially higher-salary jobs and reduces the probability
that students choose low-paid "public interest" jobs.  We also find some evidence that debt affects
students' academic decisions during college.  Our estimates suggest that recent college graduates are
not life-cycle agents.  Two potential explanations are that young workers are credit constrained or
that they are averse to holding debt.  We find suggestive evidence that debt reduces students' donations
to the institution in the years after they graduate and increases the likelihood that a graduate will default
on a pledge made during her senior year; we argue this result is more likely consistent with credit constraints
















  The returns to a college degree have risen substantially in recent years, but the cost of 
higher education has risen even more quickly.  Between 1993 and 2005, the college wage 
premium rose by 27 percent (Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto 2007)
1, while real tuition and 
fees at public and private four-year colleges rose by 63 percent and 43 percent, respectively 
(Trends in College Pricing 2005, Table A1).
2  These rising costs have made financial aid more 
important.  The proportion of full-time, full-year undergraduates receiving financial aid rose 
from 58.7 percent in 1993 to 76.1 percent in 2004 (Snyder, Tan, and Hoffman 2006, Table 320).   
As aid packages have grown, so has the importance of student loans.  The proportion of 
students on aid who take out at least some loans rose from 55 percent in 1993 to 65 percent in 
2004; over the same period, the proportion receiving grant aid fell slightly, from 83 to 82 percent 
(authors￿ calculations based on Snyder et al. 2006, Table 320).  As a result, college graduates￿ 
debt burdens have risen.  The average college graduate in 1993 had incurred $8,462 in student 
debt.  In 2004, this had risen to $13,275.  Among those with positive debt, the average rose from 
$12,565 in 1993 to $20,386 in 2004.
3 
  Some argue that the looming need to make loan payments leads students with debt to 
major in career-oriented fields or to choose more lucrative post-graduation jobs than would be 
otherwise optimal.
4  They also argue that educational debt deters individuals from purchasing 
                                                 
1 http://www.epi.org/datazone/06/wagebyed_a.pdf 
2All figures in this paper are inflated to 2005 dollars using the CPI-U.  The figures for college costs are 
enrollment-weighted.  
3 Student debt dwarfs another oft-cited source of indebtedness, credit card debt.  The average senior in 2004 
owed $512 in credit card debt (the median was $0; the average and median among those with positive credit card 
debt were $2,874 and $1,654, respectively).  These figures and those in the text are computed from the 1992-3 and 
2003-4 National Postsecondary Student Aid Surveys (NPSAS; see Loft et al. 1995 and Cominole et al. 2006). 
4 See, for example, Kamenetz (2006).  A nationwide survey conducted by the Nellie Mae Corporation in 
2002 found that 17 percent of student loan borrowers reported the loans had significantly impacted their career plans 
(Baum and O￿Malley 2003).  Minicozzi (2005) analyzes data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey,  
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homes or getting married, or assuming other responsibilities typically associated with full-
fledged adulthood (Chiteji 2007). 
The traditional economic view of borrowing and saving rules out these sorts of effects.  
In a standard life-cycle model, student debt has only an income effect ￿ proportional to the ratio 
of debt to the present discounted value of total lifetime earnings ￿ on career and other post-
college decisions.  As debt represents just over one percent of lifetime earnings for a typical 
college graduate, we expect any such effects to be extremely small.   
One reason debt may nonetheless matter is that young people ￿ particularly those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds ￿ may be ￿debt averse￿ (see, e.g., Burdman 2005, Callender and 
Jackson 2004, and Field 2005).  If holding debt reduces utility independent of any effects on 
consumption, recent graduates may attempt to repay loans quickly or otherwise act as if debt 
payments are more constraining than they really are.
5   
A second potential source of non-trivial debt effects on post-graduation decisions is a 
failure of capital markets.  While much of the literature in education focuses on students￿ access 
to credit before and during college (see the discussion below), credit constraints after college 
graduation can also affect decisions.  Young workers￿ current annual incomes are typically much 
lower than their permanent incomes, and many may prefer to borrow to finance current 
consumption.  If recent graduates are unable to do this, student debt will have first-order effects 
on early-career consumption, and recent graduates may attempt to minimize these effects 
through their job choices.   
                                                                                                                                                             
and finds that graduates with more educational debt take jobs with higher initial wages and lower rates of wage 
growth than do those with less debt. 
5  We focus on students who are inframarginal to the college attendance decision, so aversion to taking on 
debt (as distinct from continuing to hold previously incurred debt) is unlikely to be an important factor.    
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There is suggestive evidence from non-educational contexts that many consumers are 
unable to borrow at reasonable interest rates.  For example, Warner and Pleeter (2001) find that a 
majority of members of the Armed Forces selected a lump sum separation payment over an 
annuity even though the internal interest rate of the annuity option exceeded 20%.  Gross and 
Souleles (2002) report that well over half of households with credit cards regularly roll over debt, 
with the median revolving account equal to about $7,000 and a typical interest rate around 15 
percent. They also find that credit card debt rises, immediately and significantly, when credit 
limits are increased, especially for those who were already close to their limits.
6  Finally, 
Souleles (1999) and Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) find that consumption increases 
substantially after families receive income tax refunds, where the standard model predicts that 
predictable income shocks should have no effect on consumption. 
In educational settings, the evidence on imperfections in capital markets is mixed and 
inconclusive.  Cameron and Taber (2004) study the impact of borrowing constraints on 
educational decisions by exploiting the fact that the direct and opportunity costs of education 
have different effects on credit constrained individuals.  They find little evidence that constraints 
limit otherwise-optimal educational investment.  Heckman and Lochner (2000; see also Carneiro 
and Heckman 2002) also argue that borrowing constraints during the college-going years are not 
important determinants of college attendance, and that family income affects attendance 
primarily through its effect on students￿ academic preparedness.  In contrast, Ellwood and Kane 
(2000) argue that differences in college attendance by family income are partly explained by 
credit constraints.  Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (undated) conclude that some college 
                                                 
6 In addition, many families pay college tuition bills with credit cards, and roll over the resulting debt.  This 
would not be rational unless these families lacked access to educational loans with lower rates.   
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students are credit constrained, though they argue that this does not account for family income 
differences in college persistence. 
  Our focus in this paper is on the effect of educational debt on students￿ early career 
decisions.  We take advantage of a unique natural experiment.  In the early 2000s, a wealthy, 
highly selective university (hereafter referred to as Anonymous University, or ￿Anon U￿) phased 
in a ￿no-loans￿ policy, under which the loan component of financial aid awards was replaced 
with expanded no-strings-attached grants.  Using data on Anon U financial aid recipients before 
and after the implementation of this policy, we can compare the academic outcomes and career 
choices of otherwise-identical students who graduated from Anon U with very different debt 
positions.  We also have data on students who did not receive financial aid, which permits us to 
control for unobserved factors (such as the state of the macroeconomy) that might have led to 
different outcomes for students in the pre- and post-reform cohorts even in the absence of the 
policy change.  Our empirical strategy combines control function and instrumental variables 
strategies to take advantage of within- and between-cohort variation in the composition of 
financial aid packages.  The debt effect is identified from changes across cohorts in the debt 
assigned to otherwise identical students (in particular, to students with the same financial need 
and family resources).   
  We find evidence, consistent across several specifications, that debt leads graduates to 
choose higher-salary jobs.  Much or all of this effect is across occupations, as debt appears to 
reduce the probability that students choose low-paid ￿public interest￿ jobs.  Debt effects are most 
notable on the propensity to take a job in the education industry.  We also find suggestive 
(though imprecise) evidence that financial constraints affect students￿ academic performance 
during college.  
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To help us distinguish whether these effects are due to credit constraints or aversion to 
debt, we analyze data on alumni pledges and donations.  One would expect debt aversion to be 
reasonably constant over the life cycle, and therefore college seniors should anticipate its effects 
on their future choices.  By contrast, college students may not anticipate the degree to which 
credit constraints will bind in the period after graduation.
7  Although our estimates are imprecise, 
debt seems to have a larger effect on recent graduates￿ actual gifts to Anon U than it does on the 
pledges they make during their senior year.  This appears to support the credit constraints 
hypothesis.  Because the effect is small and because we can only speculate about the degree to 
which agents anticipate post-graduation constraints and debt aversion, this interpretation should 
be taken as suggestive rather than conclusive. 
  We describe the no-loans policy in more detail in Section II.  Section III presents a 
simple multi-period model of consumption that formalizes the interaction of debt with credit 
constraints in influencing career decisions.  Section IV develops our full estimation strategy, 
starting from a difference-in-differences estimator and building toward a richer specification that 
combines control function and instrumental variables methods.  We describe in Section V the 
rich data, drawn from Anon U￿s administrative records, used for our analysis.  Section VI 
presents results.  Section VII discusses the generalizability of our results to wider student 
populations.  Section VIII concludes. 
II.  The Anon U Policy Reform 
Anon U is one of the most selective, expensive colleges in the country, and it admits only 
the most academically qualified students.  It prides itself on the diversity of its students, and it 
                                                 
7 One reason for a failure to anticipate this is that students have access to a variety of government and third-
party loans on relatively good terms.  Access to this sort of credit dries up after graduation, and recent graduates are 
likely to have to rely on forms of borrowing ￿ e.g., credit cards ￿ that offer substantially worse terms than those they 
faced during college.   
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competes with other elite colleges to enroll the relatively few high school graduates of modest 
means with top academic credentials (Hill and Winston 2006).     
In 1998 and again in 2001, Anon U officials announced reforms of their financial aid 
program to reduce the role of student loans in aid packages.  Grants were expanded to fill the gap 
left by loans, and total nominal aid awards ￿ the sum of the face value of loans, grants, and 
campus work ￿ were approximately unchanged.  As the present value of a grant (which need not 
be repaid) is much higher than that of even a subsidized loan, these reforms represented a 
substantial increase in the value of Anon U￿s aid packages.  Officials at Anon U claim the 
reforms were undertaken to eliminate financial concerns from the decision to apply to or attend 
the school and to increase the number of low-income students matriculating.  The policy was not 
explicitly undertaken to influence the post-graduation plans of students.
8    
  To fully understand the implications of this reform for students, it is useful to consider 
how Anon U determines a student￿s financial aid package.  Students are admitted to Anon U 
without regard to their financial circumstances.
9  Along with her admissions application and in 
every academic year thereafter, a student may apply for financial aid.  The aid application 
solicits detailed information about the income and assets of the student and her parents.  The 
Anon U financial aid office uses this information to develop an assessment of the family￿s ability 
to pay, following a modified (and more generous) version of the formula used by federal aid 
                                                 
8 Financial aid can be seen as a form of price discrimination as generous aid policies allow colleges to 
reduce the price of attendance for a group of students who are likely to be the most price sensitive without 
discounting the cost for wealthier students whose demand is likely less elastic.  Seen in this light, the policy 
amounted to an increase in the degree of price discrimination.  It also had substantial publicity value as Anon U got 
a great deal of press attention for its efforts to be more affordable.  Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse (2006) find a 
small demand response to the no-loans policy, with a very small increase in matriculation rates among affected 
admitted students.  Some of Anon U￿s peer institutions have since announced similar reforms, each to great fanfare. 
9 Anon U, like many other highly endowed universities, promises ￿need blind￿ admissions.  In fact, there is 
reason to suspect that Anon U and its competitors give small preferences to needy applicants, as a mechanism for 
maintaining economic diversity.  Bowen, Kurzweil, and Tobin (2005, pp. 101-108), however, find that any such 
preferences are quite small.  
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programs.  The primary determinants of the ￿expected family contribution￿ (EFC) are parental 
income and assets, though student savings and summertime earnings also enter the calculation. 
  Whenever the EFC falls short of the total annual costs of attendance ￿ tuition, room, 
board, and an estimate of additional living expenses ￿ the student is judged to need aid.  Anon U 
puts together a personalized aid package that closes the gap.  An aid offer has two ￿self help￿ 
components: a student loan and a campus job during the term.  Each of these is capped ￿ students 
are not expected to work more than about 10 hours per week during the term or to incur more 
than about $4,500 in debt per year of enrollment (or approximately $18,000 over four years).
10 
Any remaining demonstrated need after reaching the self help limits is met through 
unconditional grants.
11   
    Students may take up their offered aid packages in whole or in part.  Not surprisingly, 
take-up on the grant component ￿ free money ￿ is high.  But students commonly substitute 
among the self-help components, working more during the term and taking on less debt or vice 
versa.  Even the total quantity of self help is elastic: some students take on additional debt in 
order to relieve the burden on their parents, while others reduce their need by saving more than is 
expected from summer earnings, consuming less during the year than the aid office budgets, or 
drawing on more assistance from their parents than was indicated by the aid formula.
12     
                                                 
10 The interest rate on loans is subsidized.  Estimates of the present value of the subsidy range from about 
$0.25 (Gladieux and Hauptman 1995) to $0.60 (Feldstein 1995) per dollar of loans.  Similarly, most campus jobs ￿ 
particularly those under the federal ￿work study￿ program, which subsidizes the wage bill for the lowest-income of 
Anon U￿s students ￿ pay above-market wages.   
 
11 The formula thus indicates that students whose demonstrated need is less than the sum of the self-help 
caps are not allocated any grants.  There are several exceptions to this, however.  First, students who are eligible for 
federal Pell Grants or who win external scholarships can use these to displace self help.  Second, conversations with 
the Anon U financial aid staff indicate that most students with positive demonstrated need are given at least a token 
institutional grant.  Anon U is unusual in this regard ￿ less wealthy universities will typically give grants only to 
students with larger need, and are not always able to provide enough aid to meet the full demonstrated need.  
12 Parents may themselves take on debt, through federal ￿PLUS￿ loans or unsubsidized loans from Anon U 
or third-party lenders, but the terms on these are usually worse than those on student debt.  
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  Under the new Anon U policy, the loan cap was lowered to zero.  As neither the formulae 
for computing expected family contributions and demonstrated need nor the cap on expected 
term-time earnings changed, this entailed more generous grants for nearly all students on aid.  
Students were not required to take the full value of this policy through loan reductions; some 
continued to take out loans in order to reduce term-time work or parent contributions or to permit 
more consumption during college. 
  The no-loans policy was implemented in two stages.  First, beginning in 1998, loans were 
eliminated for new matriculants from the class of 2002 and beyond with low family incomes, 
defined as below about $40,000 in nominal dollars.  Approximately 18% of aid recipients from 
the class of 2002 qualified for this in their freshman year.  Students from moderate income 
families (between $40,000 and $57,500) received partial loan reduction.  Students from pre-2002 
classes remained under the old regime and continued to receive loans regardless of their family 
incomes, as did higher-income students (approximately 61 percent of aid recipients) from later 
cohorts. 
In 2001, the no-loans policy was extended to cover all students on aid.   This phase 
applied to all students on campus at the time, regardless of cohort.  Thus, a non-low-income 
student from the class of 2002 was required to take out loans for her first three years on campus 
but was covered by the no-loans policy during her senior year and therefore was asked to take on 
75 percent as much debt over her college career as was a similar student from the class of 2001.   
Figure 1 illustrates these changes in policy by showing the total loans offered to students 
in three hypothetical families with different income levels over four years of attendance.  One 
can see that low-income students were required to take out fewer loans than higher-income 
students even before the no-loans policy was introduced.  Low-income students in the classes of  
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2002 and beyond, however, were covered by the first phase of the no-loans policy and were 
assigned zero loans.  Middle-income students were partially covered by the first phase and fully 
covered by the second phase.  Thus, those in the 2002-2004 cohorts saw dramatic loan 
reductions, while those from the 2005 and 2006 cohorts were given zero loans.  Finally, higher-
income students with need were unaffected by the first phase of the policy but covered under the 
second phase.  Those in the 2005-2006 cohorts were given zero loans, while those in the 2002-
2004 cohorts were treated in proportion to the fraction of their college careers that came after the 
no-loans policy was fully implemented in 2001-2002.  
  Figure 2 uses Anon U administrative data (discussed below) to compute the fraction of 
students in each cohort who applied for aid at any point in their careers, who were ever found to 
need financial aid, and who ever took out loans.  While the former fraction remained relatively 
stable between the 1999 and 2006 cohorts, the fraction who took out loans decreased from 46 
percent in 2002 to 23 percent in 2006.  Figure 3 provides a similar look at the dollar amounts, 
totaled over a student￿s time at Anon U and averaged over all students in the cohort with positive 
need (again, in any year).  The typical amount of student loan debt at graduation among those 
with positive need fell from over $15,000 in 1999 to $4,000 in 2006, a decrease of 67 percent.  
The sharp decline began with the 2002 cohort, the first cohort eligible for either portion of the 
no-loans program.  The reduction in loans was more than offset by increases in grant aid, with 
the difference reflecting increasing average total need.
13  Work awards actually fell slightly over 
the period.  This decline, along with the continued presence of loans even after the no-loan 
policy was fully implemented, suggests that beneficiaries of this policy consumed some of their 
reduced self-help requirements by cutting back on campus work. 
                                                 
13 The increase in total need primarily reflects increasing costs of attendance; average family contributions 
were approximately stable.  
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III.  A Simple Model of Debt and Occupational Choice 
We suggested above that student debt should have very small effects on the post-college 
choices of unconstrained students, but that if individuals are debt averse or face credit constraints 
or other limits to the ability to borrow against future earnings, debt could have first-order effects 
on graduates￿ job choices.  These claims derive from a two-period life-cycle model in which per-
period utility depends on both consumption and job amenities.  Amenities might encompass the 
total hours required, the flexibility of the work schedule, the pleasantness of the work, or any 
other aspects of a job that make it appealing.  Importantly for our empirical analysis, some 
people may derive amenity value from ￿public interest￿ work.  Because amenities have no 
natural scale, we scale them in dollars of salary forgone on the upper envelope of the choice set ￿ 
a job offering amenity level a will offer salary ψ ￿ a. 
Graduates start with student debt d and work for two periods.  Per-period utility depends 
on consumption ct, and job amenities at, u
t = u
t(ct, at), where t indexes periods and u
t has positive 
first partial derivatives and negative second partial derivatives.  The unconstrained individual 
maximizes lifetime utility 
U(c1, a1, c2, a2) = u
1(c1, a1) + (1 + δ)
-1 u
2(c2, a2) 
subject to the lifetime budget constraint, 
c1 + (1+r)
-1c2 ≤ ψ1 ￿ a1 + (1+r)
-1(ψ2 ￿ a2) ￿ d = y1 + (1+r)
-1y2 ￿ d, 
where δ is the discount rate, r is the interest rate, ψ1 and ψ2 are potential earnings in periods 1 
and 2, respectively, and y1 and y2 are actual earnings. 
With this setup, debt merely reduces lifetime income, and has solely income effects.  
These are of order d/Y, where Y = ψ 1 + (1+r)
-1ψ2 is the present value of lifetime full income.  A 
typical value for d is around $20,000, while y1 + (1+r)
-1y2 averages around $1,500,000 for  
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college graduates, so d/Y is not much above 1 percent.
14  Even a relatively low-paid occupation 
like teaching yields lifetime earnings around $1,100,000, implying d/Y below 2 percent.  Anon U 
graduates have less debt and much higher earnings, on average, than do typical college 
graduates, implying even smaller values of d/Y.
15  Consequently, we expect that income effects 
of debt are very small for life-cycle consumers who can freely borrow and save. 
Student debt can have important effects in the presence of constraints that limit agents￿ 
borrowing.  The debt position at the end of period 1 is D = d + c1 ￿ y1 = d + c1 + a1 ￿ ψ1.  A 
binding upper bound, D
*, distorts intertemporal optimization, driving a wedge between marginal 
utility in periods 1 and period 2.  The agent will choose lower values of both consumption and 
amenities in period 1, and higher period-1 earnings, than she would have chosen otherwise.  The 
magnitude of the distortion depends on D
* ￿ d, so if D
* is low enough increases in d reduce c1 
and a1 and increase y1.
16 
Credit constraints are not the only possible source of debt effects on intertemporal 
optimization.  Debt aversion ￿ a negative effect of debt held at period 1 on lifetime utility that is 
independent of the level of consumption or amenities in each period ￿ can generate a similar 
wedge between period-1 and period-2 marginal utility, with similarly distorting effects on career 
                                                 
14 The debt figure derives from the authors￿ calculations from the National Postsecondary Student Aid 
Survey of 2003-2004 (Cominole et al. 2006).  The lifetime earnings figure is the mean present discounted value and 
is computed from cross-sectional data on individuals aged 25-65 from the 2003 and 2004 March Current Population 
Surveys, assuming a real interest rate of 3.5% (Moore et al. 2004) and productivity growth of 1.5%.   
15 We do not have data on the full earnings profile of Anon U graduates.  But we can compare the earnings 
of typical young college graduates to the distribution in our data.  In the 2002 and 2003 March CPS data, the average 
annual earnings of 21-25-year-old college graduates who worked at least 45 weeks were $30,000.  This corresponds 
approximately to the 9th percentile salary among Anon U graduates who reported starting salaries in the exit survey 
from which our data are drawn. 
16 In our simple model, in which period-2 utility depends on period-1 choices only through the lifetime 
budget constraint, credit constraints increase a2 and c2 and reduce y2.  This result might not hold in a model that 
incorporates state-dependent preferences (to capture the intuition that people can become accustomed to certain 
consumption levels or to certain types of jobs).  Much depends on the degree to which the agent can anticipate the 
effect of period-1 choices on her period-2 utility function.  Our empirical analysis focuses on debt effects on y1, 
which would be positive with binding credit constraints even if preferences are state-dependent.  
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choices.  Below, we provide indirect evidence that helps to distinguish between credit constraint 
and debt aversion explanations for debt effects.
17 
IV. Estimation  Strategy 
Our goal is to identify the effect of student debt on various outcomes, both during college 
and after graduation.  We are interested in whether debt causes new graduates to make different 
choices than they would have had they reached the same decision point without debt.  The Anon 
U reform, then, provides just the right counterfactual:  students with financial need in later 
cohorts were given enough grant aid to meet that need without resorting to student loans.  A 
comparison with otherwise-identical students from earlier cohorts can identify the loan effect of 
interest, provided that pure time effects are adequately addressed. 
The most straightforward way to implement this comparison is as a difference-in-
differences (DID) analysis, comparing the between-cohort change in mean outcomes among 
financial aid recipients with the change among students not receiving aid.  Recipients were 
￿treated￿ by the no-loans policy if they were in later cohorts but not if they were in earlier 
cohorts.  Students who did not need financial aid should not have been affected by the policy 
regardless of their cohort, and can therefore be used to control for business cycle and other time 
effects.  The effect of debt on an outcome variable y can be computed as a Wald estimator, 
dividing the difference-in-differences in y by that in debt. 
The DID strategy has several important shortcomings.  First, there may have been 
changes in the relative characteristics of aid recipients over time, not least because the rising cost 
of attending Anon U shifted families who would not previously have needed aid into the aid-
                                                 
17 A final potential violation of the life cycle model is uncertainty about period-2 earnings (i.e., about ψ2).  
This may induce precautionary savings in period 1.  Absent other violations, however, preexisting debt will continue 
to have only an income effect, which will remain small if d is small relative to even a low realization of ψ2.  
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recipient category.  Failure to control for this will result in a biased estimate of the aid effect.  
Second, the DID estimator does not exploit variation in the intensity of treatment, either across 
or within cohorts.  Students with very little financial need would have taken few loans in any 
case, so were not much affected by the no-loans policy, while those with greater need got larger 
benefits.  Finally, the DID strategy cannot accommodate the partially-treated 2002-2004 cohorts. 
In the rest of this section, we develop a regression-based version of the DID/Wald 
estimator that allows us to control for changing student characteristics and to exploit variation in 
treatment that cannot be captured in a simple DID/Wald framework.  This leads us to our 
primary specification, which combines instrumental variables ￿ using simulated loan offers as 
instruments for the actual debt level to exploit only policy-induced variation in debt ￿ with a 
￿control function￿ specification that uses data on family financial circumstances to absorb 
potentially confounding variation in family background. 
The DID-based Wald estimator can be seen as an IV estimate of the following equation:  
(1)  yic = α + postc δ + needi γ  + dic β + eic, 
where yic is the outcome for student i from cohort c, postc is an indicator for whether the student 
comes from a treated cohort; needi is an indicator for whether the student has financial aid, and 
dic is the student￿s level of debt.  The interaction of the two indicator variables, postc*needi, 
serves as an instrument for dic. 
To convert this to a richer specification, we need a more detailed measure of ￿treatment￿ 
than the simple postc*needi interaction.  Let dic
99 be the loan that the student would have been 
offered had her aid package been calculated according to the formula that applied to the pre-
program 1999 cohort.  As a result of the program change, she was instead offered dic
*.  The 
treatment, then, is the difference between these, dic
* - dic




99 is a deterministic function of the student￿s expected family contribution, 
dic
99 = g
99(EFCic).  For any single cohort c, dic
* = g
c(EFCic) is another deterministic function, 
though the shape of this function varies substantially with c.  For c ≥ 2005, g
c(EFC) = dic
* ≡ 0, 
while for earlier cohorts g
c(EFC) more closely resembles g
99(EFC) (particularly for non-low-
income families).  The continuous-treatment analogue to the needi control in (1) is a flexible 
control for the effect of the expected family contribution on outcomes, f(EFCic).  We also 
generalize the postc dummy to a series of cohort dummies.  Our primary estimating equation is 
thus: 
(2)  yic = δc + f(EFCic)  + dic β + eic, 
with first stage equation 
(3)  dic = θc + h(EFCic)  + (dic
99 ￿ dic
*) π + vic. 
  Note that if the f() and h() functions are sufficiently flexibly parameterized, they will 
absorb all of the variation in dic
99, which does not vary across students with the same expected 
family contributions.
18  Thus, (3) can be equivalently written to use the student￿s own offered 
loan, dic
*, as the instrument, and indeed we do this in our empirical implementation.
19  Within 
any single cohort, dic
* would be absorbed by a sufficiently flexible h() function, but with data 
pooling multiple cohorts a single h() function cannot absorb the variation in dic
* among students 
in different cohorts with the same EFCic.  Thus, it is only the cross-cohort variation in the g
c() 
function ￿ deriving from the Anon U reform ￿ that identifies the debt effect in (2).  The central 
identifying assumption of our strategy is that the direct effect of family characteristics (or at least 
that operating through the EFCic variable) on outcomes is constant over time. 
                                                 
18  Recall that dic
99 is what each student would have been offered in loans under the pre-program formula. 
19 We have also performed our analysis using dic
99-dic
* as the instrument.  This yields very similar estimates.  
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   Granting this assumption ￿ to which we return later ￿ our IV strategy should eliminate 
two possible sources of bias that would arise in simple OLS estimates of the effect of debt on 
outcomes.  The first and most important is omitted variables.  Most of the variation in student 
debt ￿ and all of the variation in offered debt within a single cohort ￿ derives from differences in 
families￿ financial resources.  Family background is likely to have strong effects on academic 
and employment outcomes.  If it is excluded from the estimating equation, both dic and dic
* will 
be correlated with the error term.  The inclusion of a flexible control function in the expected 
family contribution in our IV specification should eliminate the resulting bias since, as noted 
above, the offered loan is a deterministic function of the EFC.  The possibility that EFCic does 
not capture all dimensions of family background does not present a problem:  So long as the 
projection of other family background characteristics onto the expected family contribution is 
constant over time, these characteristics will be uncorrelated with dic
* conditional on EFCic.
20   
A second possible source of bias is reverse causality.  Empirically, there is a fair amount 
of variation in actual loans that is unexplained by the loan offer.  This variation may reflect 
differences in tastes or in expectations about future earnings.  In particular, those who expect 
high future earnings (i.e., have a high eic when yic is earnings) should consume more in college, 
and may take out more debt to finance this.  This will bias an OLS estimate of β from equation 
(2) upward, but this bias is eliminated in the instrumental variables estimate.
21 
 We  construct  dic
* by applying the Anon U aid formula for the student￿s cohort to the 
observed expected family contribution variable.  By the argument above, this is uncorrelated 
                                                 
20 This strategy can be seen as a propensity score estimator, albeit with a continuous treatment variable, as 
flexible controls for EFCi absorb the endogeneity in dic
*.  
21 In practice, there is some evidence that the financial aid office occasionally deviates from its formula in 
response to student requests, particularly when Anon U is in competition with other colleges for a particular student.  
For our purposes, the ￿offered loan￿ is that indicated by the formula, even if in practice a different offer is made.  
This avoids any endogeneity of the negotiated aid package.  
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with the residual component of family background, so long as f() and h() are sufficiently flexible.   
We model each as a cubic polynomial.  To guard against the possibility that this fails to fully 
capture the variation used in the loan assignment, we control for the total financial need and, in 
some specifications, for the loan that would have been offered had the student been in the 1999 
or the 2002 cohort (i.e., dic
99 and dic
02).  With these controls, the debt effect is identified solely 
from across-cohort variation among students who would have been offered the same aid package 
had they been in the same cohort. 
Our identifying assumption would be violated if there were differential underlying trends 
in the employment outcomes of students receiving and not receiving financial aid.  One possible 
source of such differential trends might be changes in the composition of the Anon U aid 
population.  In some specifications, we include controls for several non-aid student 
characteristics:  indicators for whether the student was a legacy (i.e., had parents who attended 
Anon U), the first in the family to attend college, or a recruited athlete; a cubic in family income; 
and a full set of indicators for the academic and non-academic ratings given to the student￿s 
admissions application.  These additional controls have essentially no effect on our estimates.  
We also report specifications that allow for changes in the returns to student characteristics over 
time by including unrestricted interactions of students￿ SAT scores ￿ indicators of ability that are 
correlated with financial need ￿ with cohort indicators.  This, too, has no effect on the results. 
A final issue is the possibility of sample selection.  The Anon U policy was well 
publicized, and some of the cohorts used in our analyses entered Anon U after the policy was 
announced.  If students made college choices on the basis of the policy, this could induce 
selection bias in our analysis.  Linsenmeier et al. (2006) find evidence that the policy increased 
Anon U￿s yield from admitted students ￿ the fraction who chose to matriculate ￿ in the cohorts  
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that matriculated shortly after the announcement of the first policy change.  This effect is quite 
small, amounting to approximately 30 students per cohort.  Sample selection of this sort is 
unlikely to bias our results.  As a validity test, however, below we present analyses that exclude 
students who entered Anon U after the full no-loans policy was announced as well as all low-
income students.  The loan effect is then identified from non-low income students from the 2002-
2004 cohorts, who were partially treated by the no-loans policy. 
V. Data   
Our data come from Anon U￿s administrative records, and describe students from the 
cohorts that entered between Fall 1995 and Fall 2002 and graduated, for the most part, between 
1999 and 2006.
22  We merge data from several independent databases, using identifiers that are 
common to all of Anon U￿s student records.
23  The registrar￿s data include 9,287 students from 
the 1999-2006 classes.  We have complete data on admissions qualifications, financial aid, and 
employment outcomes for 8,641 students.
24 
A.    Financial Aid Data  
Our key explanatory variables come from financial aid records.  We observe the expected 
family contribution and the size and composition of the aid award.  We convert all dollar figures 
to 2005 dollars.  The aid data are in student-year format, while most of our analysis focuses on 
student-level records.  We sum the student loans taken over all years that the student appears in 
                                                 
22 91 percent of Anon U matriculants graduate within four years and 96 percent graduate within five years.  
We have found no evidence that the no-loans program influenced time-to-graduation. 
23 For confidentiality reasons, we were given data containing only an anonymized version of this ID 
number.  The anonymization algorithm was the same in each database, however, permitting us to merge them. 
24 70% of the missing observations are students who have not graduated, split approximately evenly 
between those who have dropped out and those who are still active (the latter overwhelmingly from the classes of 
2005 and 2006).    
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the aid data, and average the expected family contribution over the student￿s (first) four years of 
enrollment.   
The financial aid formula specifies the loan that should have been offered to each student 
as a function of the difference between the cost of attendance and the expected family 
contribution.  This formula does not always seem to be followed in the data, in part because 
some students negotiate changes to their initial awards and only the final amount is reported.  We 
use the formula to simulate the loan that should have been offered to each student in each year, 
given her family￿s income and the computed expected family contribution.     
Not all students apply for aid in every year.  This complicates our analysis, as the 
expected family contribution is computed only for aid applicants.  We assume that any student 
who did not apply for aid would not have been found to have need in any case.  This implies that 
her expected family contribution is at least as high as the cost of attendance, and we impute this 
value.
 25   
Other details of our data construction are discussed in a Data Appendix that is available 
from the authors.  In general, our decisions were made with an eye toward maximizing the 
comparability of the data across cohorts.  This leads us to censor variables from some cohorts to 
match the censoring that may have occurred in other cohorts.  For example, a family in the 1999 
cohort whose contribution exceeded the cost of attendance might not have applied for aid.  
Because costs rose over time, a family with the same income in the 2005 cohort might have 
applied for and received aid.  We censor this family￿s contribution at the 1999 cohort￿s real cost 
of attendance, to preserve the symmetry with our treatment of the non-applying family from the 
                                                 
25 Some students who apply for aid have EFCs that are above the cost of attendance.  We censor these at the 
lower level, and include dummy variables in our regressions for the number of years that the EFC was imputed or 
censored.  Another complication arises because estimated costs vary with, for example, the distance between the 




26  Our loan simulation is based on this censored contribution, although results are 
robust to alternative censoring rules ￿ e.g., using the actual costs as the censoring point ￿ and to 
the use of uncensored data. 
Table 1 presents estimates that relate the composition of the actual aid package, 
cumulated over all years of enrollment, with the simulated cumulative loan offer.  Each 
specification includes controls for cohort (a full set of dummy variables), a cubic in the parental 
contribution, indicators for the number of years that the contribution is censored and the number 
of years that the student applied for aid, and the student￿s cumulative financial need.  With such 
rich controls, the simulated loan coefficient is identified exclusively from the differential effects 
of across-cohort variation in the loan formula on students with different need levels.  If our 
simulation perfectly captured offered loans and if all students perfectly complied with the 
￿intended￿ treatment, the simulated loan effect on actual loans would be exactly one, that on 
actual grants exactly -1, and the effects on other variables would be zero.  In reality, the 
estimated effects on loans and grants are likely attenuated by imperfections in our simulation and 
by imperfect compliance. 
Column 1 presents an analysis in which the dependent variable is the total debt incurred 
over a student￿s time at Anon U.  While the simulated loan offer coefficient is significantly 
different from one, it is nevertheless large ￿ the realized cumulative loan rises by about $0.77 for 
each additional dollar of offered loans ￿ and quite precisely measured.  Columns 2 and 3 take as 
dependent variables the other components of the aid award.  The estimated coefficient for grant 
aid (Column 2) is -0.90.  Again, this is significantly different from the theoretical effect of -1, but 
                                                 
26  That is, for each student we assign dic
*=gc[min(EFCic, cost99)] where cost99 was the cost of attending 
Anon U for the class of 1999.    
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in practical terms the deviation is small.
27  Column 3 presents an analysis of term-time student 
work.  For each dollar of loan reduction, term-time earnings fall by 8 cents.
28  Column 4 
indicates that the simulated loan is weakly (but significantly) negatively associated with total aid, 
the sum of grants, work, and loans.  As we control for need, and as Anon U always offers an aid 
package that meets total need, the negative point estimate indicates that take-up of aid packages 
is lower when these packages include more debt, perhaps because some students substitute 
additional parental contributions for offered loans.  
B.   Other Data 
We create a variety of control variables and outcome measures from other administrative 
data sets.  We draw from admissions data the student￿s SAT score and legacy status, the type of 
high school attended (public or private), and the numerical ratings given to the application.  The 
registrar provided information about the major, minors, grade point average (GPA), and honors 
received.
29  Our richest outcome measures come from an ￿exit survey￿ conducted by the Office 
of Career Services during the week before graduation.  The survey asks about plans during the 
next year, and students who have already obtained jobs are asked their occupations, industries, 
and annual salaries.  Response rates are typically above 97 percent.  Finally, the Development 
Office provided information on students￿ donations to the university￿s ￿annual giving￿ 
campaigns in the first several years after graduation.  Anon U￿s solicitations start early, and 
                                                 
27 The most likely explanation is that we do not capture adjustments made to the formula award on a case-
by-case basis by financial aid staff. 
28 We do not observe actual earnings, but only the assumed earnings that were included in the final 
financial aid offer.  Upon receipt of the original offer, which might have specified $0 in loans and $1500 in term-
time earnings, students were permitted to negotiate alternative divisions of the ￿self help￿ component between loans 
and work.  Our point estimate indicates that a student receiving a $0/$1500 initial award negotiated a final award 
that specified $120 in debt, on average, and $1380 in work. 
29 There are no double-majors at Anon U, and minors are permitted in only a limited number of fields that 
are (typically) not available as majors.  The available minors include finance, public policy, various foreign 
languages and area studies, and elementary/secondary education.  
 
21
students are asked during their senior year to make pledges covering each of the next five years.  
We observe both pledges and actual gifts, though our ability to look several years beyond 
graduation is limited for the most recent classes.
30 
  Table 2 presents comparisons of the observable characteristics of students from the 1999-
2001 cohorts (nearly all of whom graduated before the no-loans program) and those from the 
2005-2006 cohorts (who entered after full implementation).  We distinguish between students 
with positive financial need, who would have been affected by the no-loans policy, and students 
without need, who would not.  Columns (1) and (2) show the average characteristics of ￿no-
need￿ and ￿need￿ students in the earlier cohorts, while columns (3) and (4) show the same 
groups in the later cohorts.  Columns (5) and (6) show the change over time for each group, and 
column (7) shows the difference between these.   
  Students with need have lower average SAT scores than those without need, are less 
likely to be white, and are much less likely to have attended private high schools (although even 
so, a third of students with need attended such schools).  There were few changes between the 
two cohorts in racial composition or the type of school attended.  Elite college admissions 
became much more competitive over this period, however, and SAT scores rose dramatically in 
both the need and no-need subgroups.   
  The remaining rows of the table show financial characteristics, which we observe only 
for students who apply for financial aid and which are therefore shown only for students with 
need.  Real family incomes of students with need rose about 8 percent between cohorts, and 
mean expected family contributions rose by a bit less than $900.  Average need rose by over 
$12,000.  This primarily reflects the increasing cost of attending Anon U ￿ tuition, fees, and 
                                                 
30 Our alumni gift data were extracted in Fall 2006, so we do not observe gifts for the class of 2006, 
observe only one year of gifts for the class of 2005, and so on.  
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room and board collectively rose by $12,122 over this period.
31  Despite the increase in need, 
average student loans fell dramatically, from $15,485 in the 1999-2001 cohorts to less than 
$3,500 in the 2005-6 cohorts.  Some students without demonstrated need took loans as well, but 
the average amounts are quite small.
32  The difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the 
no-loans program on the total debt that students incur is -$11,389. 
  Table 3 presents DID analyses of our primary outcome measures, grouped into 
￿academic,￿ ￿career,￿ and ￿alumni gifts￿ categories.  Aid recipients have lower GPAs and rates 
of honors receipt than non-aid recipients.  GPAs rose for both groups of students in the later 
cohorts, with a slightly larger increase for aid recipients.  There were no meaningful changes in 
honors receipt.  Small effects on this outcome appear in our IV analyses below.   
Our model suggests that in the presence of debt aversion or credit constraints debt will 
lead students to substitute toward higher-salary jobs with lower levels of job amenities, 
particularly in the years immediately after graduation when constraints are likely to be most 
binding.  We find little relative change in aid recipients￿ propensities to plan employment or 
graduate school during the year after graduation, nor in the probability that they will have a job 
lined up as of graduation.  There do appear to be shifts in the types of jobs that they take, 
however, as measured by the industry.  We consider two groups of high-salary and two groups of 
low-salary industries.  Our first group of high-salary industries includes consulting
33, banking, 
and finance jobs, which collectively account for over half of Anon U students with jobs on 
graduation.  Our second group adds to these a group of industries ￿ like pharmaceuticals and 
                                                 
31 The increase in costs may explain the increase in the family incomes of students with need (which 
amounts to about $6,000 at the mean), as families whose expected contributions fell between the old and new tuition 
levels would have been judged to have need in the later period but not in the earlier period.  
32 We have been told that some students who apply for aid but are found not to have need are nevertheless 
offered token aid packages composed primarily of ￿self help.￿  The decline in loans among no-need students may 
indicate that loans were removed from these packages when the no-loans policy was implemented. 
33 We also include in this category individuals who listed other industries (e.g., health care) but reported 
￿consulting￿ as their occupation.  
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computer products and services ￿ that also offer high mean salaries.  On the low-salary side, we 
first consider the nonprofit, government, and education sectors (together 19 percent of our 
sample), then expand this to include other low-salary industries like publishing and architecture. 
Aid recipients shifted out of industries with high average salaries and into lower-salary 
industries, while there was little change in the industry composition of jobs taken by students not 
on aid. While there was no relative decline in the share of aid recipients taking jobs in the 
consulting, investment banking, and finance sectors ￿ the most prominent high-salary employers 
of Anon U graduates ￿ there was a notable increase in the share taking jobs in the nonprofit, 
government, and education sectors.
34  Consistent with this shift, we see that aid recipients￿ mean 
salaries did not increase at the rate seen among non-recipients.  Effects of debt are most likely at 
the lower end of the salary distribution, and indeed we see that the fraction of non-aid students 
with salaries below $41,395 (the 25
th percentile salary in our data) fell substantially while there 
was no corresponding drop among students on aid. 
The last rows of the table show mean alumni pledges and gifts for the year immediately 
following graduation, when alumni are perhaps most likely to be financially constrained.  We see 
significant increases in both pledges and gifts from aid recipients.  The change for non-aid-
recipients ￿ who both pledge and give more than recipients in all cohorts ￿ is smaller and not 
significant.  
All of these changes are consistent with the presence of debt effects on students￿ career 
choices and on the constraints that they face after graduation.  They can be readily converted into 
Wald estimators of the effect of student debt by dividing by the difference-in-differences in total 
loans, -$11,389 (from Table 2).  Estimates are shown in Column 8 of Table 3.  They indicate that 
debt may slightly reduce grades, reduces the probability of taking a job in a low-paid sector, 
                                                 
34 There is no clear pattern in the industries from which these students are drawn.  
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substantially increases the mean salary for those students who have jobs, and somewhat reduces 
alumni gifts.  These descriptive changes may be confounded, however, by changes in the 
characteristics of students who receive aid.  In the next section, we present analyses that use the 
IV and control function strategies outlined above to obtain consistent individual-level estimates 
of the effect of debt on student outcomes. 
VI. Results 
A.  Effects on Employment Outcomes  
Table 4 presents regression estimates of the effect of student debt (in $10,000s) on the 
employment outcomes from Table 3.  Column 1 shows sample sizes; these are smaller for 
outcomes that are only available for students who have accepted jobs and who report annual 
salaries than for other outcomes.  Columns 2 - 4 present OLS results, without any controls 
(column 2), with a cubic in the expected family contribution and a linear control for the total 
need (column 3), and with those controls plus a vector of other family background and academic 
quality controls (indicators for being a first-generation college student, a legacy at Anon U, or a 
recruited athlete, plus academic and non-academic admissions ratings and the simulated loan 
under the rules that applied to the 1999 and 2002 cohorts) in column 4.
35  The next three 
columns repeat these specifications but instrument for the observed loan with our simulated loan 
offer.  The first stage coefficients in the three specifications are shown in the first row.  As in 
Table 1, the coefficients suggest that the instrument is strongly related to the actual loan amount 
and that a dollar in simulated loans increases a student￿s actual debt by about 77 cents.  
                                                 
35 Columns 2 and 3 also include controls for the number of years that the family contribution was censored 
or imputed.  We present only linear probability models.  Results are similar (though more difficult to interpret in IV 
specifications) when we instead use probit models.  
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In the simplest specifications without controls, we estimate no effect of debt on the 
likelihood that an individual plans to attend graduate school and a statistically significant, 
positive effect on the likelihood of planning employment.
36  When we add controls for family 
financial circumstances, the effect on whether the student plans employment is largely 
unaffected but that on whether the student plans to attend graduate school becomes significantly 
negative, suggesting that the original estimate was confounded by differences between students 
with and without financial need.  Effects on both graduate school and employment decrease and 
become statistically insignificant (partly because standard errors rise substantially) in IV 
specifications although the point estimates indicate positive effects on employment and negative 
effects on graduate school.  We similarly find no debt effects in IV specifications for the 
probability that a student has found a job by the time of the survey. 
  The next rows examine the distribution of accepted jobs across industries.  We see little 
impact of debt on the probability that a student takes a job in the high-salary groups of industries.  
By contrast, we find negative, statistically significant effects of debt on employment in the low-
salary occupations.  Specifically, in our preferred specifications in columns 6 and 7, we estimate 
that an extra $10,000 in student debt reduces the likelihood that an individual will take a job in 
nonprofits, government, or education by about 5 to 6 percentage points.  This is a large effect, 
particularly when compared with the approximately 17 percent baseline share of students going 
into these sectors.  Further investigation (not reported in Table 4) indicates that this is driven 
primarily by the education sector: in the specification from Column 6, $10,000 in student debt 
                                                 
36 The predicted effect on whether the student plans to attend graduate school is ambiguous, as loan 
payments can be deferred while a student is in school.  Still, undergraduate loans may deter debt-averse students 
from taking on further debt for graduate school.  
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reduces the probability of taking a job in education by 3.3 percentage points (standard error 
0.20).
37   
  We next look at the impact of college loans on a student￿s actual starting salary.
38  Our 
preferred specifications indicate that an additional $10,000 in debt leads students to accept jobs 
that pay about $2,000 (p-value 0.06 ￿ 0.10) more in annual salary, on average, and reduces the 
likelihood that the salary is below $41,395 by about 6 percentage points (p-value 0.09).   
  Overall, it appears that college debt affects post-graduation employment decisions: 
students with more debt are less likely to accept jobs in low-paying industries and accept higher-
paying jobs more generally.  Both results are consistent with debt aversion or the presence of 
credit constraints.  These effects on industry and starting salary are large.  The current Stafford 
loan interest rate is 6.8 percent, suggesting that a $10,000 loan paid off over ten years (the typical 
repayment period) would have annual payments of $1,380.  Our result thus implies that after-
debt-payment income rises with debt.  This may be explained by taxes:  with a 33 percent tax 
rate, our point estimates imply that after-tax earnings rise one-for-one with debt payments.   
B. Robustness 
  Table 5 presents several alternative specifications ￿ using different loan measures, 
instruments, samples, and control variables ￿ meant to gauge the robustness of our employment, 
industry, and salary results.  Column 1 repeats the estimates from Column 5 of Table 4 for 
                                                 
37 19% of Anon U students with education jobs teach in private schools; 26% work for Teach for America 
or for other similar organizations.  Our samples are too small to distinguish effects of debt on the distribution of 
students within the education sector, but point estimates give no indication that either of these types of jobs accounts 
for the effect. 
38 We have examined the sum of the starting salary and the anticipated annual bonus, with qualitatively 
similar results.  Only 42% of students with jobs report an expected bonus, however, and the survey form does not 
distinguish missing values from zeros.  We have also explored imputing salaries for the 21% of students who have 
jobs but do not report their salaries, using observed salary responses from other students working for the same firms.  
Estimates using the imputed data are similar to those reported in Table 4, with similar standard errors once the 
variation introduced by the imputation is accounted for.  
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several key outcomes.  Column 2 adds to the endogenous debt measure the sum of any loans that 
students￿ parents have taken from Anon U, either via the PLUS program or from Anon U￿s 
unsubsidized parental loans office.
39  This has little effect on the estimates. 
Column 3 returns to the original specification of the endogenous variable, but forms the 
instrument from an alternative simulation that uses the aid formula that applied to the years that 
the student was actually in attendance rather than those that applied to the first four years after 
the student enrolled.  This simulation is identical for the 96 percent of graduates who enrolled for 
four consecutive years and graduated on time, as well as for 0.3 percent who graduated early 
after enrolling for three consecutive years.  It differs only for students who took time off before 
graduating or who spent more than four years at Anon U.  Not surprisingly, the alternative 
instrument yields nearly identical results. 
  Column 4 excludes the 2005 and 2006 cohorts as well as all low-income students from 
the sample.  One concern with the earlier results is that we include students who might have 
enrolled as a result of the program.  Non-low-income students in the classes of 2002-2004 were 
grandfathered into the program after they had already enrolled at Anon U and so the program 
could not have affected their application and matriculation decisions.  Estimated debt effects in 
this column are generally similar to those in our main specifications. 
  Finally, Column 5 includes in the specification interactions of the student￿s SAT score 
with a full set of cohort dummies.  The macroeconomy weakened somewhat over our sample 
period, and this may have had differential effects on high- and low-ability students.  This 
                                                 
39 Our data on parental loans extend only through the end of the 2004-5 academic year.  We thus exclude 
students from the 2006 cohort in this column.  
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specification controls for this, at least to the extent that the SAT score proxies for ability.  
Estimated debt effects are essentially unchanged.
40 
We have also explored specifications that allow debt effects to vary with students￿ 
predetermined characteristics.  Debt seems to have the largest effect on the salaries and 
employment choices of high-SAT students with low financial need, though these estimates are 
imprecise.  There does not seem to be any substantial variation of debt effects with gender.
41   
C.  Effects on Educational Outcomes at Anon U 
  The estimates presented above indicate that debt reduces students￿ probabilities of taking 
low-salary jobs.  It may also have effects on students￿ job qualifications.  Students who are or 
expect to be more financially constrained may study more (if alternative activities are expensive) 
or less (if term-time employment tightens the time constraint) than those with more disposable 
funds.  On the other hand, students anticipating a desire to obtain a high-paid job after graduation 
may make different choices while at Anon U.  Thus, we also examine the effects of debt on 
students￿ academic performance. 
  Results are presented in Table 6.  Specifications are parallel to those in Table 4.  The first 
rows show effects on the student major, as measured by the broad academic division (social 
sciences, humanities, physical sciences, or engineering).  OLS control function estimates seem to 
show that debt is associated with higher probabilities of majoring in the social sciences and 
humanities, at the expense of engineering.  IV estimates without controls show the opposite 
                                                 
40 Macroeconomic changes may have induced changes in the relative behavior of aid- and non-aid students 
over time that do not derive from ability differences between the two groups.  We have explored specifications that 
allow for EFC-time interactions, but given the gradual implementation of the program indicated in Figure 1, this 
absorbs most of the variation in our instrument and leads to extremely imprecise IV estimates.  The structure of the 
Anon U program evidently does not allow us to weaken our identifying assumption this much. 
41 There are too few black and Hispanic students at Anon U to permit meaningful subgroup analysis.  
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effects.  When we combine the two strategies in columns 6 and 7, both effects become 
insignificant, although the point estimates indicate a non-trivial shift toward engineering.   
The next rows show effects on specific majors.  Debt seems to have a positive, 
marginally significant, effect on the probability of choosing an economics or engineering major, 
both of which are associated with access to high-salary jobs.  It has a negative, imprecisely 
estimated, effect on choosing a major from within a group that might be categorized as non-
remunerative.
42  We find no indication of debt effects on academic minors, including the public 
policy and teaching certificates that seem most closely associated with the employment outcomes 
seen earlier. 
  The final rows show models for students￿ GPAs and for whether they graduate with 
honors.  In our basic IV control function specification (column 5), debt seems to have large 
negative effects on each.  However, when we control for students￿ entering academic credentials 
in column 6, these effects shrink substantially and become indistinguishable from zero.   
  On the whole, debt appears to have small effects on the choice of major, at most inducing 
a small shift toward majors that might be seen as oriented toward employment and away from 
￿consumption￿-type majors, and zero or small negative effects on academic performance.  There 
is no indication that the debt-induced shift toward higher-paid jobs might derive from a positive 
effect on students￿ employability.  Thus, it seems reasonable to interpret the earlier estimates of 
debt effects on employment outcomes as reflecting students￿ preferences rather than constraints 
imposed by their academic performance. 
                                                 
42 We classify all of the humanities, history, history of science, anthropology, political science, and 
sociology as ￿non-remunerative.￿  We include in the ￿economics or engineering￿ category students with other 
majors who earn minors in finance, many of whom are bound for financial industry jobs.  
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D.  Effects on Alumni Giving 
  Finally, we consider the effect of student loans on annual alumni giving to Anon U.  
There are two reasons to expect effects of debt on alumni gifts.  First, if students perceive debt 
relief as a gift from the University, increased donations may be a way to show their gratitude.  
Second, if debt causes students to be constrained after college, it will also increase the shadow 
cost of contributions and therefore reduce their level (at least during the constrained years).
43  
Data on pledges can also inform our analysis.  Students approaching graduation seem likely to be 
able to anticipate their desire to give to the university, but may not anticipate the constraints that 
they will face in the ￿real world.￿  We compare actual gifts with those pledged during the senior 
year, when the Anon U Development Office asks students to commit to their annual gifts for the 
next five years.
44  Differences between what students pledge and what they actually give can be 
seen as evidence of unanticipated financial difficulty (or bounty).  
  We present estimated effects in Table 7 for five measures of alumni gifts.  Each 
specification uses the IV-control function specification from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 6.  In 
Column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the student pledged a donation.  In 
Column 3, it is an indicator for actually donating.  Columns 4 and 5 examine the amount of the 
pledge or donation, assigning zero for students who did not participate.  Finally, Column 6 
examines an indicator for whether or not the gift fell short of the pledge (which occurs about one 
quarter of the time in the first year after graduation).  The rows of the table examine gifts in 
different years:  the first row presents results for gifts during the first year after graduation (62 
                                                 
43 Anon U has a large endowment, so the primary cost to it of a deferred contribution is foregone 
investment earnings.  Like other elite universities, Anon U typically earns higher returns than most individual 
investors.  Still, even if a potential donor fully internalizes the effect on Anon U of deferring a contribution, the 
implied interest rate is most likely lower than that available to her from other lenders. 
44 Conversations with Anon U students suggest that peer pressure is an important motivation for pledges.  
We see no reason to expect, however, that the importance of peer pressure should change with the introduction of 
the no-loans policy.  
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percent participation, unconditional mean gift $21) and for pledges concerning gifts during that 
year; the second row results for gifts during the second year (64 percent participation, mean gift 
$27); etc.  Note that the sample sizes are notably smaller in the bottom rows.  We have data only 
through the summer of 2006, so cannot observe gifts during the 4
th year for the class of 2003, 3
rd 
year for the class of 2004, 2
nd year for the class of 2005, or any year for the class of 2006.
45  
  The results suggest that college debt has no effect on whether students pledge donations 
(column 2).  Debt does appear to have negative effects on whether students actually give (on the 
order of 3 percentage points per $10,000 in loans), though these are only marginally statistically 
significant (p-value 0.07 for year 1, 0.13 for year 2).  We see similar patterns for amounts:  
effects on pledges are small (except in year 4, for which the sample includes only the classes 
through 2002), while there are somewhat larger effects on actual gifts.  Column 6 indicates that 
debt has significant positive effects on the probability of falling short on a pledge, at least in the 
first year after graduation. 
We interpret Table 7 as providing further, indirect evidence that students do not follow 
the life-cycle model in the first years after college graduation.  The effects are small in absolute 
magnitude but are reasonably large relative to the average gift from a recent graduate.
46  
Moreover, the estimates of larger effects on actual gifts than on pledges and of negative effects 
of debt on the probability of fulfilling a pledge offers suggestive evidence that can help to 
distinguish credit constraints from debt aversion as explanations for the failure of the life-cycle 
model:  this result suggests that recent graduates are surprised by the effect that debt has on 
                                                 
45 The class of 2005 is the first fully-treated class.  Thus, estimates for year 2 and beyond are identified only 
from partially-treated students. 
46 Anon U￿s officials may be interested in whether the no-loans program will pay for itself through 
increased donations.  This depends strongly on the growth rate of debt effects as graduates age.  Median nominal 
contributions from the class of 1985 over the first 20 years were 23.5 times the four-year median for that class.  If 
debt effects grow at the same rate, the total effect of $10,000 in debt reduction will be to increase donations by $318, 
only a fraction of the cost of replacing $10,000 in loans with grants.  Of course, donations are highly skewed, and a 
single large donation could overturn this calculation, as could increases in mean donations in the years beyond 20.  
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them, a reaction that seems more consistent with unexpected credit constraints than with 
foreseeable debt aversion. 
VII.  Generalizability of Findings 
An important question concerns the generalizability of our results.  Our analysis derives 
from a sample of students at a particular school, and our results might not extend to typical 
college students.  There is at least good reason, however, to suspect that debt effects should be 
larger for typical students than for Anon U graduates.  Table 8 presents comparisons of 
academic and financial characteristics of Anon U students from the 1999-2001 cohorts with 
those of nationally-representative samples of aid recipients in various categories.
47  We consider 
three comparison samples of institutions.  The narrowest category consists of private four-year 
institutions that are classified (according to the Carnegie taxonomy) as Research I and II, PhD 
granting I and II, comprehensive I and II, or liberal arts I and II.
48  Column 3 adds 4-year public 
institutions in the same Carnegie classifications.  Finally, Column 4 includes students from all 4-
year schools.  Students receiving need-based financial aid represent approximately 40 percent of 
Anon U￿s seniors, 67 percent of 18-24-year-old seniors at comparable private institutions, and 48 
percent of students at comparable public and private institutions or at all four-year institutions.     
Anon U is one of the most selective schools in the country, and in an academic sense its 
students are clearly unrepresentative.  They have much higher SAT scores and are more likely to 
have attended private high schools than their counterparts in any of the comparison samples.  Aid 
recipients at Anon U are wealthier than students on aid nationwide, but generally are reasonably 
                                                 
47 The comparison samples are drawn from the 2000 NPSAS (Riccobono et al. 2002).  We restrict our 
attention to dependent students aged 18-24 who were enrolled full-time in 1999-2000 and graduated in that year.  
Because the NPSAS is a point-in-time survey rather than a panel, we select in both the NPSAS and the Anon U data 
on receiving aid during the senior year.  Characteristics of Anon U students from later cohorts are similar in all 
dimensions except average student loans. 
48 Anon U is a Carnegie Research I school.  
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comparable to aid recipients at private colleges.  For example, the mean family income among 
students receiving need-based financial aid at Anon U was approximately $93,000 (in 2005 
dollars), whereas private college aid recipients had average family incomes of $84,000 and aid 
recipients overall had average incomes of $74,000.  Approximately 30 percent of Anon U aid 
recipients and 36 percent of those at comparable private schools have family incomes below 
$60,000 (which corresponds roughly to the upper threshold for the ￿middle income￿ category in 
Figure 1).  Aid recipients at Anon U thus come from somewhat wealthier families than do those 
at less selective institutions, though the differences are not large.   
  Table 8 also shows statistics for student debt.  Students receiving financial aid at Anon U 
before the no-loans program incurred an average of $16,597 in educational debt over their 
college careers.  Cumulative debt levels were nearly double that amount in comparable private 
colleges and universities and slightly less for graduates from all institutions. 
  Table 8 offers several reasons to expect that debt effects will be at least as large for 
typical students as for Anon U students.  First, debt levels at Anon U are relatively low, and 
Anon U students are for that reason less likely to reach any given debt ceiling than are students 
from other schools.  Second, Anon U students earn higher salaries after graduation than typical 
college graduates.  An analysis of Current Population Survey data indicates that college 
graduates aged 21-24 and employed full-time throughout 2001 had mean salaries of $36,800 (in 
2005 dollars), far below the average of around $50,000 for employed Anon U students (Table 3).  
Even if access to credit is independent of earnings, high salaries might reduce the utility cost of 
constrained consumption and thereby reduce the effect of debt on job choices.
49  Third, Anon U 
students￿ parents have relatively high incomes, and may be able to offer intra-family loans that 
                                                 
49 Desired borrowing depends on the ratio of permanent income to present income.  This ratio is plausibly 
higher for Anon U students than for others.  
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permit consumption smoothing without employment distortions.  Finally, Anon U￿s students￿ 
higher SAT scores may indicate that they make better decisions, which again might reduce the 
effect of debt on choices.   
VIII. Conclusion 
  There is widespread concern about the level of debt incurred by those acquiring a post-
secondary education.  Among the concerns is that the debt burden distorts graduates￿ post-
schooling decisions.  However, the basis for such concerns is unclear.  In standard economic 
models, with well-functioning credit markets, student debt should have only income effects on 
career and consumption decisions of life-cycle optimizers; since debt composes such a small 
portion of an average college graduate￿s lifetime earnings, these effects should be quite small.  In 
this view, debt is the ideal mechanism for financing college education, as it permits a student to 
internalize the full costs of her investment decisions.  There is no reason to think that high levels 
of student debt represent a market failure that warrants intervention. 
In the standard model, Anon U￿s no-loan program should have had essentially no effect 
on its beneficiaries￿ career choices.  This is not borne out by the data.  When students were 
relieved from the need to incur debt, they shifted toward lower-salary jobs in public service 
industries.  The point estimates indicate that changes in employment choices were large enough 
to entirely offset the effect of student debt on after-tax, after-loan-payment earnings in the first 
years after graduation.  The standard model cannot rationalize a response of this magnitude. 
Our paper adds to an existing body of evidence that consumer behavior is poorly 
characterized by the life-cycle model.  The most plausible explanations for our results are that 
recent college graduates are averse to holding debt or that they face constraints on their ability to 
borrow against future earnings, either of which could lead to non-trivial effects of student debt  
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on occupational choices.  Unfortunately, we have limited ability to distinguish between these 
competing explanations.  We find suggestive evidence that debt reduces students￿ donations to 
Anon U in the years after they graduate and increases the likelihood that a graduate will default 
on a pledge made during her senior year, indicating that seniors do not fully anticipate the effects 
of debt.  We believe this finding is more consistent with credit constraints than debt aversion, as 
it seems likely that seniors will be able to anticipate their future debt aversion and less likely that 
they will correctly forecast constraints on their ability to borrow.  This conclusion is necessarily 
tentative, however. 
There are many outstanding questions about the role of debt in decision-making that we 
do not address.  We have no direct evidence, for example, that student loans crowd out other 
forms of borrowing.  If student debt prevents graduates from obtaining home mortgages ￿ which 
are typically taken out several years after college graduation ￿ effects on utility could be larger 
than those captured by our employment analyses.  Another important avenue for further 
investigation concerns the effect of post-graduation credit constraints on pre-college decisions.  
If young people anticipate that taking on debt will constrain their consumption choices early in 
their careers, even free access to student loans will not lead to optimal educational investment.  
Clearly, optimal design of college financing mechanisms will require a deeper understanding of 
the role of debt in decision-making and a better characterization of the availability of affordable 
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Notes:  Figure shows the loans indicated by the Anon. U. formula for students from three illustrative 
families who attend for four consecutive years, by cohort.  The "higher income" family has nominal income 
$120,000 in each year but qualifies for $10,000 in aid.  The "middle income" family has nominal income 
$48,000 and calculated parental contribution $4,000 in each year.  The "low income" family has nominal 
income $38,000 and calculated parental contribution $1,000 in each year. 
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 Figure 3.   





































































1999 2001 2003 2005
Graduating cohort (original)
Need Loan (right axis)
Grant Campus work (right axis)
 Table 1:  Simulated loan and the composition of the realized aid package
Student loan Grant Campus work Total aid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.77 -0.90 0.08 -0.06
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
R
2 0.65 0.98 0.68 0.99
Notes:  N=8,893.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Dependent and independent variables are 
cumulative over four years, and are measured in 2005 dollars.  Each specification includes a full 
set of cohort dummies, a cubic in the cumulative (censored) parental contribution, a set of 
dummies for the number of years in which the parental contribution was censored, a set of 
dummies for the number of years that the student applied for aid, and the student's cumulative 
financial need.  
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
N 1,829 1,634 1,085 1,265
SAT 1,441 1,407 1,468 1,425 27 18 -9
[98] [117] [90] [112] (4) (4) (6)
Race
Black 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 -0.003 0.017 0.020
(0.005) (0.013) (0.014)
Hispanic 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 -0.001 0.005 0.006
(0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
Asian 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.006 0.001 -0.005
(0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
Private HS 0.52 0.34 0.55 0.34 0.031 0.008 -0.023
(0.019) (0.018) (0.027)
Financial need
log(family income) 11.19 11.27 0.08
[0.68] [0.83] (0.03)
Family contribution  15,333 16,201 868
  (per year) [10,652] [12,023] (429)
Total need 86,642 99,015 12,373
[45,640] [51,243] (1,830)
Total loans 1,145 15,485 496 3,448 -649 -12,038 -11,389
[4,180] [8,311] [2,785] [6,169] (129) (269) (298)
1999-2001 (pre-reform) 2005-6 (fully treated) Change
Notes:  Need/no need categorization is based whether the student ever had positive need during her time at 
Anon U.  Family income is measured in the freshman year, only for students who had positive need in that 
year.  Family contribution is averaged over a student's time at Anon U, censored in each year at the typical 
cost of attendance in that year and imputed at the censoring point in years that the student did not apply for 
aid.  Standard deviations (for non-binary variables) are shown in square brackets; standard errors are in 













in diffs Effect of 
$10K loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Academic
GPA (N=4,419) 3.43 3.30 3.48 3.37 0.050 0.064 0.015 -0.013
[0.34] [0.41] [0.31] [0.36] (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.021)
Honors (N=5,528) 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.002
(0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.024)
Career
Post-graduation plans (N=5,421)
Plans graduate school 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.20 -0.004 -0.009 -0.005 0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.019)
Plans employment 0.61 0.63 0.58 0.60 -0.035 -0.028 0.006 -0.005
(0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.024)
Has a job 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.38 -0.007 -0.010 -0.003 0.003
(0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.024)
Industry / occupation (if has a job; N=2,048)
Consulting / I-banking /  0.58 0.51 0.61 0.53 0.034 0.016 -0.018 0.018
  finance (0.031) (0.032) (0.045) (0.044)
Any high-salary 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.60 -0.039 -0.071 -0.032 0.031
  industry (0.030) (0.031) (0.043) (0.042)
Nonprofit / govt. /  0.18 0.17 0.15 0.22 -0.029 0.048 0.078 -0.075
  education (0.023) (0.026) (0.035) (0.034)
Any low-salary 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.32 -0.006 0.085 0.091 -0.088
  industry (0.028) (0.029) (0.040) (0.039)
Salary (if has a job; N=1,689)
Observed 50,086 51,025 52,568 50,849 2,482 -175 -2,657 2,585
[15,111] [16,243] [17,014] [13,242] (1,169) (1,036) (1,562) (1,531)
Salary below $41,395  0.26 0.24 0.20 0.23 -0.057 -0.004 0.052 -0.051
  (25th percentile) (0.030) (0.030) (0.042) (0.041)
Alumni gifts (N=4,531)
Pledge for 1st year 15.2 11.4 16.3 12.9 1.1 1.6 0.5 -0.4
  after graduation [31.0] [12.6] [46.2] [18.4] (2.2) (0.8) (2.3) (2.0)
Gift in 1st year 25.1 14.6 25.3 19.0 0.2 4.4 4.3 -3.6
  after graduation [58.3] [26.8] [55.8] [36.9] (2.8) (1.7) (3.3) (2.8)
Notes:  Standard deviations (for non-binary variables) are shown in square brackets; standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Changes and differences-in-differences in bold are significant at the 10% level.  GPAs and alumni 
gift data are missing for students in the 2006 cohort.  Column 8 reports IV estimates of the effect of $10,000 in 
loans, controlling for post-treatment and any need dummies and instrumenting with their interaction.  Estimates 
do not always equal the ratio of the column-7 estimate to 1.1389 (the difference-in-differences estimate for loans, 
from Table 2) because of missing values in some dependent variables.
Table 3.  Anon U academic and employment outcomes, by cohort and financial need

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First stage 9,287 0.85 0.77 0.77
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-graduation plans
Plans graduate school 8,672 -0.002 -0.017 -0.009 0.009 -0.006 -0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
Plans employment 8,672 0.012 0.019 0.009 0.002 0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.019)
Has a job 8,672 -0.025 -0.016 -0.012 -0.025 0.006 0.011
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018)
Industry / occupation (if has a job)
Consulting / I-banking /  3,020 -0.036 -0.003 0.008 -0.063 0.006 0.015
  finance (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.036) (0.036)
Any high-salary 3,020 -0.018 -0.010 0.008 -0.020 0.014 0.014
  industry (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.034) (0.034)
Nonprofit / government /  3,020 -0.012 -0.022 -0.030 -0.004 -0.052 -0.058
  education (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.028) (0.028)
Any low-salary 3,020 -0.001 -0.007 -0.020 -0.006 -0.057 -0.058
  industry (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.032) (0.032)
Salary (if has a job)
Observed 2,441 -84 -472 30 978 2,263 2,011
(399) (558) (563) (618) (1,202) (1,199)
Salary below $41,395  2,441 -0.006 -0.005 -0.017 -0.018 -0.059 -0.062
  (25th percentile) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.035) (0.035)
Notes:  Columns 2 and 5 include a full set of cohort dummies.  Columns 3 and 6 add controls for the student's 
cumulative total need, a 3rd order polynomial in the avg. parental contribution (censored at the budget that 
applied to the 1999 cohort), and sets of indicators for the number of years the student applied for aid and the 
number of years the contribution was censored.  Columns 4 and 7 add controls for legacy status, first-
generation college student, recruited athlete, SAT score, admissions ratings of academic and personal 
qualifications (as sets of dummy variables), a cubic in family income, and the simulated loan under the rules 
that applied to the 1999 and 2002 cohorts.  In columns 5-7, the instrument is the simulated loan for the actual 
cohort, assuming that the student enrolled in 4 consecutive years.  Standard errors are in parentheses; bold 
coefficients are significant at the 10% level.  
OLS IVTable 5.  Alternative specifications




using rules for 
years actually in 
attendance
Exclude 2005 & 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st stage 0.77 0.83 0.77 0.80 0.76
(0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Plans employment 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.018
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.027) (0.019)
Has a job 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.012
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.018)
-0.052 -0.043 -0.056 -0.028 -0.060
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.043) (0.028)
Salary  2,263 2,099 2,412 3,364 2,580
(1,202) (1,327) (1,207) (1,812) (1,205)
Industry:  Nonprofit / 
  government / education
Notes:  Base specification in column 1 is from column 5 of Table 4.  Other specifications change the 
endogenous variable (column 2), the instrument (column 3), or the sample (column 4), or add additional control 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Division
Social sciences 9,166 0.000 0.026 0.011 -0.034 -0.003 -0.012
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018)
Humanities 9,166 -0.009 0.016 0.018 -0.017 -0.008 0.000
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
Physical sciences 9,166 0.005 -0.012 -0.010 0.012 -0.005 -0.010
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015)
Engineering 9,166 0.004 -0.029 -0.018 0.039 0.016 0.022
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Specific majors/certificates
Econ. or engineering  8,792 0.001 -0.033 -0.020 0.039 0.020 0.025
  major or finance certif. (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017)
Non-renumerative major 8,792 -0.001 0.047 0.029 -0.042 -0.019 -0.023
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018)
Public affairs or  8,792 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.006 0.004 0.009
  teaching certificate (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Non-renumerative  8,792 0.001 0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.006
  certificate  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
GPA 7,773 -0.098 -0.088 -0.048 -0.091 -0.036 -0.015
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
Honors 8,893 -0.082 -0.075 -0.040 -0.071 -0.028 -0.013
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017)
OLS IV
Notes:  See notes to table 4.  Table 7:  IV-Control function estimates of effects of $10,000 in loans on alumni giving
Pledge Gift Pledge Gift
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 1 7,768 -0.001 -0.035 -0.5 -3.4 0.047
(0.017) (0.019) (0.9) (1.9) (0.017)
Year 2 6,629 0.000 -0.034 -1.1 -1.6 0.029
(0.020) (0.023) (1.3) (2.5) (0.023)
Year 3 5,516 0.009 -0.028 -1.3 -7.9 0.031
(0.026) (0.028) (2.0) (3.6) (0.029)
Year 4 4,402 -0.036 0.027 -8.1 -0.6 -0.023
(0.037) (0.041) (4.8) (6.0) (0.044)
Amount Fall short of 
pledge
Participation (0/1)
Notes:  Samples exclude cohorts for which gift data are not yet available (class of 2006 in row 1, 
2005-6 in row 2, 2004-6 in row 3, and 2003-6 in row 4).  Bold coefficients are significant at the 10% 







(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAT 1,407 1,102 1,089 1,087
[116] [177] [174] [173]
Race
White 60% 80% 75% 74%
Asian 16% 3% 6% 6%
Black/Hispanic 24% 14% 18% 18%
Private HS 33% 21% 15% 15%
Family Income 93,251 83,859 74,427 74,278
[52,092] [49,149] [46,337] [46,264]
Family income < $60,000 30% 36% 43% 43%
Cumulative federal student 16,597 30,479 26,985 27,039
loans [7,877] [21,884] [21,260] [21,072]
N 1,341 1,332 2,491 2,588
1999-2000 NPSAS:  Full-time, 18-24 year old 
dependent seniors with positive aid 
Anon U:  Aid 
recipients from 
the classes of 
1999-2001
Notes:  Means; standard deviations in brackets.  "Comparable" schools include public and private not-for-profit 
colleges and universities in the Carnegie categories Research I and II, PhD Granting I and II, Comprehensive I 
and II, and Liberal Arts I and II.  NPSAS sample is restricted to full-time dependent seniors aged 18-24 with 
positive need-based aid in their senior years, and is weighted by the study weight.  Anon U sample is similarly 
restricted to students with positive need in the senior year.  All dollar figures are in 2005 dollars.